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1.

SUMMARY:

Whether a Tennessee statute that authorizes
r

-

the use of deadly force as a last resort to apprehend a
nondangerous suspect fleeing a nonviolent felony violates either

---

the Fourth Amendment or the Due Process Clause.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

On the night of October 3,

1974, two Memphis police officers responded to a call from a
person who reported that a burglary was underway next door.

..

of the officers

w~nt

One

around to the back of the house, heard the

door slam, and saw a·figure running to the back of the lot.

The

I

officer shone a light on the suspect, and could see that he was a
youth (15 years old) and apparently unarmed.

As the boy jumped

to get over the back fence, the officer fired at the upper part
of the boy's body, because he believed the boy would elude
capture in the dark once he was over the fence.
The officer was following standard procedure, because a
Tennessee statute has been interpreted as allowing the use of
deadly force against a fleeing felon rather than running the risk
of allowing him to escape.

That statute provides:

•

If, after notice of the intention to arrest the
defendant, he either flee cfr forcibly r·esist, the
officer may use•all the necessary means to effect the
arrest.
I'
The statute allows an officer to use deadly force as a last
resort to effect an arrest when no other means of apprehension is
available.
In 1975, the decedent's father brought a

§

1983 action

against the City and the police department, as well as a number
of police officials and the police ' officer who killed the
suspect, to recover damages for wrongful death caused by

-3-

violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

The

defendants other than the officer were joined on the ground that
their failure to exercise due care in hiring, training, and
supervising the officer made them equally responsible for the
death.

A decision in favor of defendants was affirmed against

the individual defendants, but remanded as against the City for
reconsideration in light
Services, 436

u.s.

statute was not
liable.

of~~ll

658 (1978).

v. Department of Social

On remand, the DC held that the

~ nconstitutional

and the City was therefore not

On appeal, the CA6 held that the law authorized seizures

- - ·~~-----------

unreasonable under the Fourth Amedment and violative of the Due
~

Process Clause as well.
The CA first noted that killing a person constitutes a
~

~~

~

common

The CA rejected the State's reliance on the English

~aw,

which authorized the use of deadly force against

~ '~suspects fleeing from any felony.

~vv~ existed

The court noted that this rule

.

at a time when all of the small number of felonies were

) I

capital crimes.

The court stated that it is inconsistent with

the rationale of the common law "to permit the killing of a
fleeing suspect who has not committed a life endangering or other
capital offense and who we cannot say is likely to become a
danger to the community if he eludes immediate capture."

TheCA

observed that the Eighth Circuit in Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F. 2d
1007 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot sub nom. Ashcroft v.
Mattis, 431

u.s.

171 (1977)

(per curiam), had held a similar

Missouri statute unconstitutional as a matter of substantive due
process because the historical basis for permitting the use of

-4deadly force against nonviolent fleeing felons has been
substantially eroded.
The CA could find only one appellate decision that had

-----

~--~---·

-- - - - - - -------

addressed the Fourth Amendment limitations on the use of deadly

---

-

- - ---------In Jenkins v. Averett,

force to capture a fleeing suspect.

424

F. 2d 1228 (1970), the CA4 held that the Fourth Amendment "shield
covers the individual's physical integrity."

The CA6 here

concluded that the statute was invalid because it was too
disproportionate, in that it does not make distinctions based on
the magnitude of the offense or on the need to apprehend the
suspect.

~CA

helJ that before taking the drastic measure of

using deadly force as a last resort against a fleeing suspect,
officers should have probable cause to believe that the suspect
poses a threat to the safety of the officers or a danger to the
community if left at large.

Use of deadly force on less

information is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The CA also found that a similar result was mandated under
the Due Process Clause.

The court held that before the state can

deprive a person of the fundamental right to life it must
demonstrate a compelling interest.

Laws that infringe

fundamental rights must be narrowly drawn, and this statute is
not.

The state's interest is compelling only when the fleeing

felon poses a danger to the safety of others.
The CA held that the Model Penal Code contains an accurate
statement of constitutional limitations on the use of deadly
force:

-5-

The use of deadly force is not justifiable ••• unless
{i) the arrest is for a felony, and {ii) the person
effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a peace
officer or is assisting a person whom he believes to be
authorized to act as a peace officer; and {iii) the
actor believes that the force employed creates no
substantial risk of injury to innocent persons; and
{iv) the actor believes that {1) the crime for which
the arrest is made involved conduct including the use
or threatened use of deadly force; or {2) there is a
substantial risk that the person to be arrested will
cause death or serious bodily harm if his apprehension
is delayed.
Model Penal Code

§

3.07{2) {b) {Proposed Official Draft,

1962).
The CA noted that its decision was in conflict with a CA2
..._...-

decision that had declined to adopt the Model Penal Code test.
See Jones v. Marshall, 528 F. 2d 132 {1975).
The CA went on to conclude that the City could not claim a
good-faith defense based upon its reliance on the state statute.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

The State argues that the decision below

calls into question similar laws in 24 states.

The Fourth

Amendment does not proscribe the use of deadly force as a
necessary last resort to capture a suspect whom police have
probable cause to believe committed a felony.

The question of

when deadly force should be applied is one of public policy that
should be entrusted to the legislature.

The CA6 had previously

upheld the statute in Wiley v. Memphis Police Department, 548 F.
2d 1247, cert. denied, 434

u.s.

822 {1977), and in Beech v.

Melancon, 465 F. 2d 425 (1972), cert. denied, 409
(1973).

u.s.

1114

The decision extends unwarranted constitutional

protection to the felon as a matter of constitutional law.

-6-

Resp argues that there is no conflict with Jones v.
Marshall, because that case was decided before Monell and decided
only that a police officer was privileged under
force.

§

1983 to use

The deadly force policies of over 70% of large cities

would not permit such force to be used in a case such as this
one.

The clear position of the organized, professional police

community refutes the state's argument that effective law
enforcement will be hampered without the authority to shoot
nondangerous fleeing felony suspects.
The Memphis Police Department has a history of relying on
deadly force to a far greater degree than necessary.

Moreover,

the policy discriminates on the basis of race, because blacks are
shot at a much higher frequency than whites.
4.

DISCUSSION:

The question here seems substantial.

On

the one hand, there are strong policy reasons for a rule that
nondangerous felons should not be killed merely to prevent their
escape.

On the other hand, it takes what may be a significant

~

arrow from the quiver of the police.

'

A "nondangerous" felon who

knows that he cannot be shot simply for trying to escape has
/

little incentive not to try.

Of course, a great number of police

)

.

departments already operate with apparent success under such a
rule.

The CA's adoption of the Model Penal Code as

constitutional gospel i~ also somewhat troubling.
The appellation "nonviolent" in this case is also somewhat
of a problem.

Although it turned out that the house was empty

and that the suspect was unarmed, burglary is a crime that is
often associated with violence.

Many burglars are armed, and

-7-

many people are killed by burglars each year.

The lumping of the

burglary suspect with an antitrust violator for constitutional
purposes does not make that much sense.

Moreover, although the

statute at issue applies only to felonies, I don't see why as a
constitutional matter deadly force could not be used against a
violent misdemeanant.
Resp's arguments concerning the discriminatory operation of
the policy are simply not relevant, because the CA6 struck down
the statute on its face.

His attempt to distinguish Jones v.

Marshall is unpersuasive, because the CA2 there was not
discussing merely the officers' privilege when acting pursuant to
policy.

The CA2 stated:

This would seem peculiarly to be one of those areas
where some room must be left to the individual states
to place-a-Iltg-h-e-r--V-aLUcreon-tne1nte-res-E 1ntn is case
of ~d vigorous law enforcement, than on
the rights of individuals reasonably suspected to have
engaged in the commission of a serious crime .•.. While
the Fourteenth Amendment may require us to make an
independent assessment of the fairness of the state
rule, however, we are today interpreting § 1983, and
within that statute states must be given some leeway in
the administration of their systems of justice, at
least insofar as determining the scope of such an
unsettled rule as an arresting officer's privilege for
the use of deadly force. Further, in the light of the
shifting history of the privilege, we cannot conclude
that the Connecticut rule is fundamentally unfair.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

Especially in light of the fact that

this is an appeal, I think review by this Court may be
appropriate.

Consequently, I recommend noting probable

jurisdiction.
There is a response.
March 7, 1984

Browne

Opin in petn.
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Memorandum for the File
No. 83-1070, Memphis Police Department v. Garner
This is a summary memorandum on the basis of a preliminary
reading of the briefs.
The caption of this case, stated above, refers to the original
§1983 suit.

The State of Tennessee was allowed to intervene, and
- ---.

because the case involves the constitutionality of a state statute,
•

•

11

\\

1t has f1led an appeal under the same number -

83-1035.

The ques-

tion presented, as stated in the jurisdictional statement, is:

"Whether Tennessee Code §40-7-108 is unconstitutional as repugnant to the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
of the United States?"

I£

--------

\ \

The petition for cert, filed by the police department and
others, states the questions differently.
same:

But the issue is the

the validity of §40-7-108 that reads as follows:

"Resistance of Officer - if, after notice of the
intention to arrest the defendant, he either
flees or forcibly resists, the officer may use
all the necessary means to effect the arrest."

2.

No. 83-1070

This statute is known as the "Deadly Force Statute" that
codifies the common law "fleeing felon" rule - a rule that
~

allows the use of deadly force against even a non-violent
fleeing felon.

Reversing the DC, CA 6 held the Tennessee

statute facially invalid.

The Facts
The briefs of the parties summarize the facts favorably
to their respective positions.

The findings of fact made by

the DC following the original trial of this case are set forth
in the petition for cert.

See A-2 et seq.

LJC: s
~ ~

In summary, Memphis

police, told by a neighbor that the home next door was being
burglarized, went to the scene where Officer Hymen went to the
west side of the house, a side yard cluttered with chicken wire
and other obstacles.

It was dark (at night), he heard a door

slam and saw a figure running from the back of the house to the
back of the lot where a cyclone fence - six feet high - extended
across the boundray of the property.
Hymen could see a garbage can placed under a window and
that "the glass was broken out of the window".

Using his flash-

light, Hymen saw a figure "in a stooped position next to the
cyclone fence".

The DC stated that:

"He (the figure) did not

appear to be armed, but Hymen could not be certain of this at
the moment."

(A-4).

Hymon shouted "halt'', and identified him-

self as a police officer.

Hymon testified that in the poor

7

3.

No. 83-1070

visibility the figure appeared to him to be a black male

-

--~---------

about five feet six inches tall and about 17 or 18 years old.
See A-5, n.

3.

The figure paused for a moment, and then

leaped to the top of the fence and was "half over" when Hymon
shot.

Using a service revolver, loaded with "hollow point"

bullets, Hymon hit the youth in the side of the head - a fatal
wound.
The youth, named Garner, was only 15 years old, he was not
armed, and although the residence clearly had been burglarized,
Garner had only about $10.00 in cash and jewelry in his pockets.
Garner had been sentenced to probation twice by juvenile courts

-p~

~Ld-1-tq

on burglary charges.
~

This suit was instituted by Garner's father under §1983
claiming, so far as presently relevant, invalidity of the

~ _, Te~nessee statute under both the "unreasonable search and seizure"

~ovision
~~

~

of the IV Amendment and the due process provision of

the XIV Amendment.

danc~ with

Tennessee law and pursuant to police department

I~- ~uctions
{IP"-

Officer Hymon, because he acted in accor-

with respect to the use of deadly force, was held

. h .
.
to h ave good f a1t
1mmun1ty.
~

.
. .
.
Follow1ng
our dec1s1ons
1n
Monell

and City of Independence (and a resulting remand to the DC for
reconsideration in light of these decisions) , the case came back
to CA 6 that held the Tennessee statute invalid.

No. 83-1070

The Decision of CA 6

4.

(~ ~~ ~~~ JIJL~

The panel of Chief Judge Edwards, and Judges Keith and Merrit
was unanimous, with the opinion written by Judge Merrit.

After

summarizing the evidence somewhat more favorably to its ultimate
holding than perhaps the findings of fact by DC justified, found
the statute facially invalid under both the IV and XIV Amendments.
The CA stated that the statute had been construed as follows:

"Tennessee courts have interpreted their
statute regarding the capture of fleeing felons
to create a jury question on the issue of the
..r'.~ ...~.
~· "reasonableness" and the "necessity" of using
J ,!/"1 .-..-<,.. deadly force.
But the "reasonableness" and
~tu'r "necessity" of the officer's action must be
,,~
judged solely on the basis of whether the
(/(1~b ·~ ...--- officer coul d h ave arrested the suspect with~~o~
~him. ~Purporting to follow the
r u le deve Loped in England at common law allowing the use of deadly force against suspects
fleeing from any felony, Tennessee courts have ~
interpreted their statute to mean that once it
~
is determined that the officer probably could ~~ 1
~~·
not_ ha e c tured the person wit hout fir i ng , W /J ~, t
t e Jury sho d 1
t e police action rea~ 7
sonable under the statute." A44

v1

.~

~~

The CA recognized that "the common law permitted the killing

of a felon who resists arrest without regard to the nature of the

V ~elony".

~

But the harshness of the common law rule was viewed as

having been ameliorated by more modern jurisprudence.

It relied

particularly on the proposed Model Criminal Code of the ALI.

No. 83-1070

5.

The rationale of CA 6 is summarized in a paragraph on p. A51 of
the petition.

I quote only a portion of it:

"The Tennessee statute in question here is
invalid because it does not put sufficient limits
on the use of deadly force.
It is "too disproportionate."
It does not make distinctions based on
"gravity and need" nor on the "the magnitude of
the offense." Before taking the drastic measure
of using deadly force as a last resort against a
~
fleeing suspect, officers should have probable
~
cause to believe not s f mp i y t h at €he suspect has
~ .
~· ~~ c omm1Et e d s ome felony. Tfi ey s h ould have proba ble
_
~~
cau~ve that the suspect oses a
11
~ . . A~
threat to t e s9 e ~ of t e o 1cers or a danger
~ ~- tl:ie cormnun~eft at large.-n- -

ho

~~
~terestingly

~~~ssent
~

-

of Chief Justice Burge;

in the Bivens case

hief drew a ~ istinct~n between the use of deadly force "to

~ re
,,...t-v·

enough, the court relied on language in th

,,

ent the escape

.

~~d
"

.

,,

of "car t hiefs, pickpockets or a shoplifter."

--~--~~

h

k1lle..,r " and to prevent t e
See ASO.

I

Comment
The briefs of the parties, including amici briefs, are
not particularly helpful.
worked phrase -

There seems to be - to use the over-

"more heat than light" in what counsel say.

The case presents a difficult and important constitutional
issue.

On the facts in this case, one's initial reaction is

No. 83-1070

6•

to think the officer committed an unjustified murder of an
unarmed fifteen year old kid whose crime was a minor breaking
and entering.

But upon more thoughtful reflection, it is clear

that the officer acted in "good faith" under Tennessee law and
as he had been instructed.

Nor were the facts quite as indefen-

sable as CA 6 and appellees' brief view

t~.

It

i~nceded

that

Officer Hymon had probable cause to believe a felony had been
committed - as indeed was the case.

In the darkness of a strange

yard, with obstructions preventing the officer from moving closer,
it was not easy to make considered judgments in the few seconds
during which the action occurred.

~no

reason to believe

be sure.

As Hyrnon testified, he had
but could not

Nor did he know whether the felon had a confederate who

~

might be armed.

Apparently he could see the person well enough

to think he was a young black, 17 or 18 years of age.
himself was a black (I believe).

Hymon

When the escaping person refused

to halt when ordered to do so, the officer did what he was taught
to do.
Thus, the case squarely presents the constitutional question
as to the validity of a "fleeing felon" statute that - according
to one of the briefs - is in effect in more than half of our
states, in addition to having been the common law rule. The quesk~~
tion that concerns me is how a con s~ tutional statute that reasonably
~

would protect both the interests of persons reasonably suspected
of crime and the general public interest in preventing felons to
escape.

There is little in CA 6's opinion that provides guidance.

No. 83-1070

7•

Borrowing from The Chief's dicta in Bivens, CA 6 says the
statute is invalid because it "does not put sufficient limits
on the use of deadly force".

It makes no distinction between

''gravity and need" nor does it require consideration of the
"magnitude of the offense".

Moreover, an officer should have

"probable cause to believe that the suspect posing a threat to
the safety of the officers or danger to the community if left
at large".
How one writes these safeguards into a statute is far from
clear.

Even if the precise language of CA 6 were included in

a statute, issues of fact would continue to exist as they did
in this case.

The Tennessee rule, based on interpretation of

the statute by its courts,

creat~ a

"jury question on the issue

A

of the 'reasonableness' and the 'necessity' of using deadly
force."

If the Tennessee construction stopped at this point,

it may be viewed more charitably.

Questions of reasonableness

present issue of fact quite similar to the factual issues that
CA 6 would create.

But apparently the Tennessee courts have

not stopped with the general requirement of reasonableness and
necessity.

As paraphrased by CA 6 the "officer's action must

be judged solely on the basis of whether the officer could have
arrested the suspect without shooting him."

If indeed this is

the law in Tennessee, I would doubt the validity of the statute.

NO.

8.

83-1070

If the facts in this case had come within The Chief Justic~s
Bivens dictum, one readily could agree.

For example, if in day-

light, an officer had seen a 15 year old kid shoplift and run,
clearly i t would have been grossly unreasonable to shoot the kid
in the back.

Burglary not only is a serious felony but also

frequently it leads to violence and sometimes to murder.

-------------

The

~------~----------~

difficulty with CA 6's decision is that Officer Hymon could not
possibly have made the judgments it would require.
be sure of the "gravity" of the burglary.

He could not

He could not even be

sure that violence had not committed within the house.

These

questions also would relate to the ''magnitude" of the offense.
How could Hymon have made an informed judgment as to the escaping
person's danger to the community if left at large"?

* * *
I have perhaps become unduly interested in this case and
talked into the dictating machine more than my secretary - or
the law clerk - appreciates.

I have little doubt that the

Tennessee statute on its face is too open-ended to be valid.
My clerk should take a close look at the Tennessee Supreme
COurt's construction of the statute.

Its validity is to be

determined only as the statute has been construed.

The range

of felonies is quite wide, and clearly it would be unreasonable
if an officer were authorized to shoot any fleeing felon regardless of the crime and the circumstances.
in my clerk's views.

I will be interested

BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:
No.

October 18, 1984

Lee
83-1070,

Memphis

Police

Department,

et

al.

v.

Cleamtee

Garner, et al.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
(1) Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit the use of deadly force to

·

effect the arrest of a " ~n-violent" felon?
(2)

tJL_____ fo~~
-r~ 2~ '

'7

If the use of deadly force must be limited to violent

is the burglary of a dwelling a "violent felony"?

I. Factual Background

-

On October 3, 1974, a neighbor reported the
a Memphis residence to the police.

felon~~

~

~~

)

.

burgl~ ~'

Two o(ficers were dispatched

immediately,
progress.

and

One

arrived

officer

while

the

remained

in

burglary
the

car

was

to

still

make

a

in

radio

report, while the other officer, Hymon, ran behind the house.

As

Hymon approached the back corner of the house, he heard the rear
door

slam shut.

He

ran into the back yard,

around with his flashlight.

and began looking

He saw the figure of a black male

crouched next to a fence about thirty or forty feet away.

The

burglary suspect did not appear to be armed.
Officer
suspect to "halt."

Hymon

identified

himself,

and

ordered

the

Nevertheless, after a short pause, the young

man started to climb over the six-foot fence.

Hymon, realizing

that he would not be able to apprehend the suspect on foot, fired
his gun at the moving figure.

The fleeing burglar was hit in the

back of the head, and he subsequently died from the wound.
deceased

was

identified

black male.

as

Edward

Garner,

Garner had taken only ten

a

The

fifteen-year-old

.- ---·--dollars and some jewelry

~--~--~-----------J

from the house, which was unoccupied at the time of the burglary.

------.

~

At

the

time

of

the

shooting,

the

Memphis

police

~

department did not have a formal policy with respect to the use f-.___. __ . 0
·~

of deadly force.

r~ r r~

Apparently,

police officers were

the force permitted by state law.
the

told

to use ~

Because Tennessee had adopted

~m?~ 1~ see Tenn. Code Ann. §40-7-108, policemen

were allowed
arrest of

~

to use deadly
fleeing felon.

II. The Decisions Below

.. f'

..

force

when necessary

to effect the

h/a</-!:>
~

~

The

decedent's

father,

Cleamtee Garner,

action against the City of Memphis,
mayor,

rights

a

§).9'83

~
the

the police department,

The plaintiff claimed that his son's

and Officer Hymon.

constitutional

filed

were

violated

by

the

shooting.

Holding

that the city and the police department were not "persons" within
the meaning of

§1983,

the

municipal defendants.
The V DC

also

defendants.

DC dismissed

See Monroe v.

dismissed

the

The court found

the

364

u.s.

against

the

Pape,

action

action against the
167

(1961).

individual

that they had acted in good faith

reliance upon a Tennessee statute, which permits a police officer
to shoot a

fleeing

felon

in order

to prevent his escape.

See

Tenn.C.A. §40-7-108.
VcA6

affirmed

the

DC's

decision

that

the

individual

defendants were protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity.
The CA reversed the DC's judgment as to the municipal defendants,
however.
658

Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436

(1978),

opinion,

a

which

was

decided

city

can

be

after

sued

for

the

DC

had

damages

issued

caused

unconstitutional "policy or custom."

by

u.s.
its
an

the case so

·~

that the lower court could reconsider

its decision in light of

Monell.
On remand,

the~C

held that its decision was unaffected

by Monell because Edward Garner's constitutional rights were not
violated by the shooting.
In

reversing

the

DC's

judgment,

CA6

held

that

Garner's fourth amendment righ ~d been violated. 1

Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages.

Edward
The

{!J/14

of

deadly

force

to

committing

only

a

capture

Garner,

non-violent

"unreasonable seizure."

who

was

felony,

suspected

constituted

of
an
.......__

TheCA found support for its decision in

a dissent by the Chief Justice.

The dissent states that a "shoot

order" to apprehend a pickpocket, car thief, or shop lifter would
be "intolerable." YBl vens v.
411 (1971)

Six Unknown Agents,

(Burger, C.J., dissenting).

403 u.s.

388,

Because Officer Hymon had

no reason to believe that Garner had committed a violent felony,
The Tennessee ~~

the shooting violated his fourth amendment rights.
statute was

held

to be

unconstitutional

to the extent that it I).J~

permitted policemen to use deadly force in arresting non-violent
felons. 2

The

criticiz~ rul §

court

for

its

failure to consider the "gravity of the offense."
CA6 further held that the Tennessee statute violates the
Due

Process

Clause

of

the

fourteenth

Because

amendment.

common law rule often deprives suspects of their lives,
be

justified

conceded

that

by
the

a

"compelling
Tennessee

state

statute

interest."
aids

the

The

state

the

it must
court
in

the

1 while the second appeal was pending, the clerk of CA6 informed
/
the Attorney General of Tennessee that Tenn. Code Ann. §40-7-108
was bei ng challenged on constitutional grounds.
Pursuant to 28
u.s.c. ~ 2 4 03(c), the ~tate filed a motion to inEervene for the
purpose 'of defending the constitutionality of its fleeing felon
rule. The motion was granted, and the state became a party to
the action.
2cA6 also stated that deadly force may be used if there is
pr bable c use to believe
e person o be~d will
cause death or ser1ou bo il
if his apprehension is
delayed." Borrowed from Model Penal Co e §3.07(2) (b), this
justification or the use
is not relevant to the
case at hand.

t ~ p~ ~ ';, n-uh
I

~

..

administration of its criminal justice system, which depends upon
bringing

suspects

to

trial.

Nevertheless,

CA6 found

that

interest was not sufficiently compelling to justify
· deadly force to apprehend non-violent criminals.
with approval Mattis v.

The

Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007

(8th Cir.

in which CAS invalidated a fleeing felon statute on
due process grounds.
Finally, the court held that the City of Me
police department, although
r---------

statute, were not entitled
City

445

Independence,

of

See
- -Owen
--

u.s.

622

Therefore,

plaintiff could recover damages from the

v.
the
~

cipal defendants.

}I. . \,1
sought review by 1hi~.
-r,-~

The municipal defendants and
this Court, and filed separate merits

DISCUSSION
I. The Common Law Rule
Tennessee
policeman may
escape.

See

shoot
Tenn

has

codified

the

fleeing

felon

~

Code

Ann.

common

law

in order

§40-7-108. 3

rule

that

a

to prevent his

This

statute

was

Supreme Court has not construed the statute so
as to perm·
the use of deadl
orce on
aga1ns v1o ent felony
suspect
In Scarborough v. State, 168 Tenn. 106 (1934), the
court tated that deadly force may be used against an automobile
th' f, if necessary to effect his arrest.
Nothing in more recent
ses suggests an intention to depart from this common law rule.
See, e.g., State v. Boles, 598 S.W.2d 821 (Tenn.App. 1980).
Indeed, in his brief filed with the CA, the state Attorney
~
General ~that "Tennessee courts and enforcement agencies
int~tute to permit the use of deadly force agasint
Footnote continued on next page.

\

.. ' ...

~~~~
invalidated by C 6,

which held

~

apprehend non-viol

the use of deadly force to
the fourth amendment.

The
at

state points
the

time

the

fourth

amendment was

it

is

unlikely that the Framers intended to preclude the
force to effect the arrest of any felon.
reasoning

is plausible,

it fails

Although this line of

to recognize that most of the

justifications for the common law rule no longer exist.

,/ ~on h5-only
murder, v rape,

a

and Y manslaughter,

few

~crimes,

were

classified

as

such

as ?,

felonies.)

Because all of these crimes were punishable by death, the use of
deadly force was viewed as an acceleration of the penal process.
Note, The Use of Deadly Force in Arizona by Police Officers, 1973
L.

& Soc. Order 481,

482.

The use of deadly force was further

justified by the necessity of capturing
the crime.

felons at the scene of

With no national network of police forces, a suspect

who eluded his initial pursuers probably would never be captured.
Note,

Deadly Force

11 Harv. C.R.

&

to Arrest:

Triggering Constitutional Review,

C.L. L. Rev. 361 (1976).

Late in the nineteenth century, several developments in
this country weakened the justifications for the common law rule.
First, an increase in the number of crimes classified as felonies
led to authorization of deadly force in many more situations than
at common law.

Second, restrictions placed on the death penalty

any fleeing felon, whatever the felony."

l

~

meant that,

in most states, the only crimes punishable by death

were those endangering life or bodily security.

u.s.

Georgia, 408
This

change

Finally,

238, 331-341

undermined

police

the

(1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
penal

departments

See Furman v.

were

rationale
established

for
all

the

rule.

over

the

country, so that a suspect who initially eluded capture was more
likely to be arrested later. 4
Tennessee's

statute

because the original
longer

exist.

The

should

not

be

justifications for

federal

courts

do

wisdom of state legislative judgments.

invalidated

simply

the common law rule no

not

sit

to evaluate

the

Nevertheless, given the

changes that occurred in the late nineteenth century, this Court
should

not

hold

the

fleeing

felon

rule

constitutional

simply

because it was recognized at common law when the fourth amendment
was ratified.

II. The Fourth Amendment Analysis

The CA' s

~

holding

that

the

fleeing

felon rule violates

the fourth amendment is not without problems.

The apprehension

of

force

a

suspect

through

the

use

of

deadly

certainly

4Although the justifications for the common law rule largely
disappeared in the late 1800's, the courts proved "reluctant to
abandon a convenient pigeon-hole disposal of cases on the basis
of whether the crime was a felony or a misdemeanor." Pearson,
The Right to Kill in Making Arrests, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 957 (1930).
Even today, in those eight jurisdictions where the legislature
has not intervened, the common rule remains unchanged. At least
eighteen other states have codified the common law rule .

..
•'

,.

constitutes a

"seizure."

u.s.

(1980)

544,

553

Cf.

United States v.

Mendenhall,

446

(a person is "seized" when his freedom of
Nevertheless,

movement is restrained) .

this seizure is "unreasonable."

it is not so clear that

In order to decide this point,

the Court must balance the government 1 s

need for

the

"seizure"

against the intrusion that the "seizure" represents.

""" rtk

~ ~r

The government has a

~Jy··pa-rr_est

{#J
~e

IY

of all sus ects.

strong

Without arrests,

criminal law can be achieved:

incapacitation,

rehabilitation,

rule enhances the state 1 s
justice,

and

otherwise

enables

would

importantly,

the

none of the goals of

there can be no retribution,

or

deterrence.

The

common

law

ability to bring suspected felons to

the police

outrun

interest in effecting the

or

to capture

outmuscle

rule deters other

some

their

fugitives

who
More

pursuers.

suspects from attempting

to

elude the police.
Although

the

non-violent felons,
realizing

can

deadly

force.

felons,

by

apprehend

a

nature,

Moreover,

because

terms

convicted,

if

interest in arresting

It is undisputed that in most cases,

Moreover,

their

a strong

the common law rule is not a prerequisite to

that goal.

police

state has

criminal
it

suspect

seems

probably

without

obvious
will

yield

later.

felon

to

to

non-violent
less

force.

they usually are sentenced to shorter prison
non-violent

felons

have

take chances when running from the police.
violent

that

resorting

the

eludes

the

police,

often

less

incentive

to

Finally, if the nonhe

can

be

apprehended

Cooperation among police departments hinders a criminal

suspect to hide anywhere in this country.

'?
•

Admittedly,~
difficult
have

to

arrest

non-violent

"need"

some

rule

make

will

Thus,

felons.
fleeing

its

for

law

the

it

more

state

does
This

statute.

felon

governmental "need" must be balanced against the "intrusion" of
the use of deadly force.
the

most

The taking of a human life is obviously

"intrusion"

serious

possible.

It

outweighs

any

conceivable interest that the state has in the common law rule.
A marginal

improvement

in

the

state's

success

rate

in dealing

with crimes against property, does not justify killing.
As
probably

the

reasoning

cannot

be

above

invalidated

suggests,
in

the

the

common

absence

of

a

law

rule

judicial

"finding" that the state's interest in dealing with violent crime
is greater

than

Traditionally,
has

not

in

looked

Mincey

v.

to

held

for

that

interest in controlling non-violent crime.

interpreting

at

the

the

scene,

and

Nevertheless,

a

the

case

'i

the

example,

the

was

,,

rourth

of

warrant

there

the

gravity

Arizona, .· lor

exception"

murder

its

amendment,

underlying
state's

the Court

offense.
"murder

In

scene

requirement was rejected.

The Court

no

between

principled

scene of
decided

a

distinction

rape,

last

robbery,

term

or burgalary.

indicates

sometimes appropriate to consider the grav1

a

that

it

is

of the underlying

~----~~----------~------------------------~~--------~

offense.
of

In Welsh v. Wisconsin, the Court held that the nature

the offense

is

an

important

actor

to consider

in deciding

whether exigent circumstances jus ify the warrantless search of a
home.
the

In Welsh,

home

of

an

the Court
intoxicated

underlying offense
~

.. .

that the warrantless search of
river

was

impermissible,

riminal traffic violation.

when

the

Given
gravity

of

the current Court's willingness

the

underlying

fleeing felon rule,

offense,

I

think

to consider
that

the

the

state's

as it applies to non-violent felons, should

be invalidated on fourth amendment grounds. 5

III. Substantive Due Process
Under
amendment,

the

the

Due

Process

deprivation

of

Clause

a

of

fundamental

justified by a "compelling" state interest.
felon

rule often results

right.

Therefore,

process decisions,
interests.

as

it

in

the

has

the

loss of
done

in

right

fourteenth
must

be

Tennessee's fleeing
"life," a fundamental

other

substantive

due

the Court must weigh carefully the relevant

See,e.g.,

Roe v. Wade,

410 u.s.

113

(1973}.

Using

the reasoning set forth in the preceding section, the Court could
find that the Tennessee statute does not further a "compelling"
state

interest.

fleeing

.........__

Mattis

-

felon
v.

At

least

one

other

court

has

invalidated

statute on substantive due process grounds.

- --------------------Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976} (en
.-

a

See

bane},

vacated sub. nom. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 43l · u.s. 171- (1977}.
Despite the plausibility of the substantive due process
approach, the Court should rely solely upon the fourth amendment

;wcy~
:,.,:;_
$ ~ 9 ~

--___,.-<-/ -

5 rn Welsh,/ the Court noted that "the State of Wisconsin has
chosen to classify the first offense for driving while
intoxicated as a noncriminal civil forfeiture 0~fense for which
no imprisonment is possible." Therefore, in ~aking its decision
as to the ~y of the offense, the Court,~as able to look to
the state legislature for guidance. A bright line between
\
violent and non-violent felonies, on the other hand, would be
drawn regardless of how a state chooses to punish these crimes.

[

in

invalidating

the

Tennessee

fourth amendment is clear,

for

statute.

The

relevance

of

the ~

its primary function has been to

~

place limits on police practices involving the apprehension and

If,'!::

investigation of criminal suspects.

~

the other

hand,

has

Substantive due process, on

been used to protect freedom of choice in

matters involving family and procreation.

The use of substantive

due

many

process

unprincipled.
Roe v. Wade,

has

been

See Ely,

criticized

by

commentators

as

The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on

82 Yale L.J.

920,

935

(1973).

Therefore,

I

think

that the Court should avoid relying upon the Due Process Clause
when

a

more

specific

constitutional

guarantee

can

be

used

to

unconstitutional

on

reach the desired result.

IV. Is Burglary a "Violent Felony"?
Tennessee's
its face,

for

fleeing

felon

rule

it allows the use of deadly force

of

non-violent

to effect the

{

f

arrest

is

criminal

suspects.

Nevertheless,

statute is not unconstitutional as applied to Garner.

the

The crime

\

that he committed should be considered "violent" for pu

of

fourth amendment analysis.
CA6
involves
thus

the

focuses

held

that

"use or
upon thEi!

a

crime

threatened

is
use

not

"violent"

of deadly

force."

facts of• the particular crime.

the court should have looked at the

~

unless

it

The CA
Instead,

of crime committed by

the suspect.
Some felonies, such as burglary, often result in
<----.- - death or serious bodily injury.
Whether physical harm occur
during a particular incident is largely a matter of chance.

~

The

~ '$~

J

state obviously has a

tremendous

interest

in ensuring

that

criminal justice system deals effectively such crimes.
violent"

burglars

are

not

incapacitated,

deterred,

they may burglarize again,

its

If "non-

rehabilitated,

or

and cause death or serious

physical injury during ensuing in9idents.
The approach taken by the CA is not meritless.

It may

be wise to limit the use of deadly force to situations when the

-----------------~------------

police officer believes that ilie '~uspect used or threatened to
---------------------------------------------~~~~---===~-----use deadly force ~ First proposed by the drafters of> the Model
Penal Code,

fourteen state legislatures have adopted this rule.

Nevertheless,
into

a

this

model

constitutional

legislation

should

not

The

state

requirement.

be

transformed

has

a

large

interest in dealing effectively with crimes that often result in
death or physical
whether

a

crime

injury.

is

Therefore,

"violent,"

for

I

think that the decision

purposes of

fourth

amendment

l'

ll

analysis, should depend upon the type of crime co mitted. -- ~

SUMMARY
CA6
felon

was

L

~-

the

on

arrest

its

in

finding

of

face,

that

violates

"non-violent"

the

Tennessee's

fleeing

amendment •
•
Policemen should not be permitted to use deadly force in order to
effect

statute,

correct

felons.

fourth

Nevertheless,

the

ta t~u_t_e___i_s__n_o_ t _ u_n_c_o_n_ s _t _i_t_u_t_l_·o_n_ a_l _ a_s__a_P_P_l_i_e_d__t _o_ t_h_ e__f_a_c_t_s__o_f_ t_h_ i s

case.

A crime should be considered "violent," if it is the

~

.

of crime that often results in death or seriously bodily injury.
entering
to

the

of

victims.

a

dwelling
Therefore,

wi 11
the

result

Memphis

in

police

officer was justified in using deadly force to apprehend Garner.
The judgment of CA6 should be reversed.

alb

10/27/84

TO: Justice Powell
FROM: Lee
RE: Nos. 83-1035, 83-1070, Tennessee v. Cleamtee Garner, et al.
and Memphis Police Dept. v. Cleamtee Garner, et al., the Model
Penal Code definition of burglary
Section 221.1 (1) of the Model Penal Code defines
"burglary" as the entry "of a building or occupied structure
with the purpose to commit a crime therein, unless the premises
are at the time open to the public or the actor is licensed or
privileged to enter."

The Introductory Note recognizes that it

would be possible to eliminate "burglary" as a separate offense.
The criminal action could be treated as an attempt to commit the
intended crime plus an offense of criminal trespass.
Nevertheless, the drafters decided to treat ."burglary" as an
independent substantive offense because of their "considered
judgment that especially severe sanctions are appropriate for
criminal invasion of premises under circumstances likely to
terrorize occupants."
The definition of "burglary" itself reflects the
~

drafters' concern for human safety.

The entry must be

unprivileged; unprivileged entries, unlike the shoplifting
situation, often result in physical violence.

Moreover, the MPC

provides that an affirmative defense to a prosecution for
burglary is that the building or structure was abandoned.

~

This,

of course, suggests that the drafters were less concerned about
"crimes against property."

[

'

83-1035

TENNESSEE v. CLEAMTEE GARNER

Argued 10/30/84

)'(~ ( ~.,JP-€-ffl-.- ~~)

~~~~~~~
~~,c~ a~d~t.fl
C/f~~~~~

~~~~

c//6~~~~~
A.-2--~-~~J

~~a-~ ~a-S.t
.k_~.J'~~~-~
~~I'U:-~~.

(!_~ (

a-.-1-4- c;:

7 ~ ---

'k.c ~~~A ~1-C¥..

.

~,.~-~~.........

,.

-

.

w-:.,. {'!.¥/IQE•

•

~J~..,. r~. ~---/ 4\2.-~

lir'~-uL~~~~~
-t.<...~~...v-~-~
a - ~.,~,.b a ..t~..£L---I-,.~ ~ ~ ___t-

~.:::i...; ~ a~-u~w~

dt.J...L

&J.,~~ ~ ~

~~~~~ .. ~-~

~.

0 IP~ ~"...........
~~~~ ~~-<i~~~-d4/J
~~~~,_,

"""';;&..&.o...........

~1-~ CA&,·_r ~~-ef
~~hL~-4~~.12v(71~ ~

~?-~)

UJ~~,Lo~
~~~9-~~~~

~~.

~tY-u-~.·~

c~~~a..~t
~...,.~~

jl!JJt)

«r

~

~3-

--r

/D3j-

/~. V

L1.
7 -~

?b-~-'4 ~~~ ~-~

).~~~-~

~~~~~
~~t!1f~
~. ~~u- ~ 4-:4.,/J

rK-

.

/'J<--~-- k-,4> ~ ~·
~
T~~~~~

~~~~J~

3.~f-:;Z-~.
~}~~~~ldk

~,

~.£L-- ~;~

c~~
~ ~~ In u"Sing deaaly force if the susp~ct na
.. co~tted._: v&Ien~ ~ if they ha~ robable..caui '
to 15eliev~~~ that he will endanger th
,physica_! safety of others if not capture
statu w

-

. -.~~~~

~~J,y·ls-~

?z-.o~--~~
~~~~
~-17/182~
.s~
J. ~c.-c...~
. zwa••

~n

~

~~~

dkd~~~~J

··.

.

..

-

Tennessee v. Cleamtee Garner

. No. 83-1035

Justice White

Conf. 11/2/84

~~ ~~ .t..-4; ~ ,

~1~ ~Ld'~8.

tt/~~~~1-z-~

#k-

~ ~ _,. d-t9 ~~- ~L-/-

L.A-),

~~;__f~~~io
~~.
~ ~ ~ ~ f:!. ~"' (Z-u.~l

J'

r

~ ~ta:-- ~,to

:z:::_

~.e& ~~- ~-- ~

~'.c..,__-

Justice Marshall

~l_~£o ~~ ~ ~s
~~~~~~~~

~~~

!?'~~fr-G~~~ ..... ~'
~~~~,

~

Justice Blackmun

trk<-"5

-t+

-"'

~ ~~9~

~~

v~

.L.:224 £t:Uv~ ~ tinA- ¥-u_~ -A-2- ~
?2~~~~1-;:r

Justice Powell

c:2/f- ~
-;)JZ.L~~~

Justice Rehnquist

~,...£~

~~~~~

~~~d~1'~~~
~ 4.--~~d-1-~l..r.

Justice O'Connor

~

L!4c_~~
~~~~4u_~~
~~! ~~~;1 ~~~

~~ =./-- ~Lf- ot~~ ~
~

6

.

LEVEL 1 - 5 OF 13 STORIES
Copyright <c> 1982 The Washington Post
September 30, 1982, Thursday, Final Edition
SECTION: M'e tro; C4
LENGTH:

680 words

HEADLINE: Police Add 50,000-Volt Weapon to Arsenal
BYLINE: By Ed Bruske and Alfred E. Lewis, Washington Post Staff Writers
KEYWORD:

TASER

BODY:
Future shock has arrived in the District of Columbia police department.
Tomorrow, members of the department's Special Operations Division are
scheduled to add to their arsenal a 50,000-volt weapon called a Taser, a
handgun the size of a flashlight that temporarily immobilizes suspects by firing
electrically-charged darts.
<c> 1982 The Washington Post, September 30, 1982
Yesterday the weapon was demonstrated for reporters and police officials from
the city and surrounding jurisdictions. The darts were fired into Kichael
Dinenna, a 250-pound Bethesda bar manager to whom police had paid $250 for the
experiment.
When the darts had penetrated his clothing and the outer surface of his skin,
Dinenna~ 6-foot-7, instantly fell to the floor of the lineup room at police
headquarters, a paralyzed lump.
--He was able to rise in about 10 seconds, but police could have kept him
stunned and on the ground by inc reasing *ttle current through wires attached to
the darts, police said.
Deputy Police Chief Karty K. Tapscott said four of the weapons, costing $200
each, will be deployed by special operations for a six-month trial period. If
proved effective, he said, Tasers may eventually be placed in police patrol
cars throughout the city.
Tapscott emphasized that the new weapons are not intended to replace service
revolvers, but as a device to subdue unruly suspects, while avoiding physical
harm to either civilians or police officers.
<c> 1982 The Washington Post, September 30, 1982
"I see the use being very selective," Tapscott said. "If no situation came up
in six months where we had to use it, then we don't need it."
The Taser is being used by dozens of police departments across the country,
with apparent enthusiasm .
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and found it useful in some situations.
Fairfax County police spokesman Capt. Andrew Page said four Tasers have
been in use on a test basis since April, and the department is considering
ordering seven more, one for each of the county's police substations.
Page said the Tasers have been called into action three times, twice on the
same individual. That man, Page said, was a noncooperative "weight-lifter type"
whose parents had signed mental commitment papers to have him taken away.
Page said the man was zapped once to get him to the hospital, and then, after
being treated and released, he again was ordered commited and he again resisted
-- until police approached with the Taser.
(c) 1982 The Washington Post, September 30, 1982
"He didn't want to get shot again," Page said.
"If you've ever worked on a car and touched a spark plug while the motor was
runningi then you know what it feels like," said Prince George's County Police
Sgt. Bi 1 Spalding. "It's the same pulsing sensation, only 20 times worse."
Spalding got the Taser's darts in his thigh last year during a
demonstration in which he pretended to hold a cocked revolver to the head of a
hostage. Both he and the revolver fell to the floor before he could pull the
trigger.
Prince George's police have used Tasers to subdue two drug-influenced
suspects at the Capitol Centre. On another occasion, while trying to serve
commitment papers, Spalding used a Taser on a man who had barricaded himself
inside his house with a wooden club.
"It knocked him right out of his house slippers," Spalding said.
Police in Los Anoeles have had the use of 80 Tasers for the last year and a
half. Department sp6kesman Pat Connelly said another 300 are being ordered for
patrol cars.
(C)

1982 The Washington Post,

"I think it's a wonderful weapon," said Gary Hankins, head of the bargaining
committee for the Fraternal Order of Police, the labor organization for
rank-and-file officers.
deadly
GRAPHIC: Picture, Steve Lyddane hold Taser weapon in his hand as he explains
how device works. By Craig Herndon -- The Washington Post
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HEADLINE: The Taser Zap
BYLINE: Suzanne de Lesseps
BODY:
It was a scene right out of James Bond. Last November two jewel thieves
accosted a diamond merchant in N.ew York City, zapped him with an electric Taser
dart gun and stole away with $100,000 worth of loot. The merchant suffered only
temporary after-affects from the stinging attack. In ~iami last fall, a young
woman fired a Taser gun at a gas station attendant and made off with the
station•s cash. "I fell on the floor and couldn•t move," William Lawson said
after the incident. "It was like sticking your finger in a wall socket ..• the
worst pain I ever felt."
Ccl 1976 Congressional Quarterly , April 23, 1976
What is this new, high-voltage weapon that sells for $199.50? Also known as
a " stun gun, " the Taser was invented by a California man named John J. Cover,
who always wanted to build an electronic rifle patterned after those owned by
Buck Rogers and Flash Gordon. What he finally came up with, is a hand-held
device weighing only one-and-one-half pounds which transmits an electric current
through two darts, each attached to 15 feet of wire. The darts are fired into
the skin or clothing of the victim.
"When the Taser•s electrical force is powered into the body, it generates an
electric current that dominates [theJ neuromuscular system," says promotional
advertising for the weapon. "When an attacker has been •Tasered,• the muscles
in his body involuntarily contract; he is virtually helpless and may experience
pain." The most attractive feature of the Taser, according to its marketers, is
that it is not lethal and its effects are over in minutes. Some doctors,
however, have charged that the Taser can cause grave injury, particularly if
used against young children, the elderly or those with heart problems.
The Taser has primarily been marketed as a self-defense weapon--a device for
housewives, students, shopkeepers and security guards to use in case of attack.
But as the examples above show, the Taser has appealed to perpetrators of crime
as well. In New York City, the electrical device has been declared illegal, and
according to a ruling by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms all
<cl 1976 Congressional Quarterly , April 23, 1976
Tasers bought and sold after Friday, April 30! must be registered as firearms.
In the world of mystery novels and science fiction, electric zap guns are
romantic and intriguing. In reality, however, they may not be quite as
appealing.

.SJqJrtmt <lfonrl uf tift ~b .Statts

..-u-Jri:ngbtn. ~. <If.
CHAMI!IERS OF"

21lp'!~

November 9, 1984

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

RE:

/

No. 83-1035) - Tennessee v. Garner
83-1070)- Memphis Police Dept. v. Garner

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Although I find it difficult to say the action
of the officer was unreasonable, I am prepared to affirm
on the narrow basis Byron and some others discussed.
I have assigned it to Byron.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ~
No. 83-1035

TENNESSEE, APPELLANT

83-1035

v.
CLEAMTEE GARNER, ETC., ET AL.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
MEMPHIS POLICE DEPARTMENT, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS

83-1070

v.
CLEAMTEE GARNER, ETC., ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[December -

, 1984]

JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to determine the constitutionality of
the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of an apparently
unarmed suspect~elon. We conclude that such forc~y
not be used unle~ecessary to prevent the escape an'am e
of~sonabll believes that t e suspect poses a signific~ ath or serious physical injury to the officer or
others.
I
At about 10:45 p. m. on October 3, 1974, Memphis Police
Officers Elton Hymon and Leslie Wright were dispatched to
answer a "prowler inside call." Upon arriving at the scene
they saw a woman standing on her porch and gesturing to-

J
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ward the adjacent house. 1 She told them she had heard
glass breaking and that "they" or "someone" was breaking in
next door. While Wright radioed the dispatcher to say that
they were on the scene, Hymon went behind the house. He
heard a door slam and saw someone run across the back yard.
The fleeing suspect, who was petitioner's decedent, Edward Garner, stopped at a six-feet-high chain link fence at
the edge of the yard. With the aid of a flashlight, Hymon
was able to see Garner's face and hands. He saw no sign of a
weapon, and, though not certain, was "reasonably sure" and
"figured" that Garner was unarmed. App. 41, 56; Record
219. He thought Garner was 17 or 18 years old and about
5' 5" or 5' 7" tall. 2 While Garner was crouched at the base
of the fence, Hymon called out "police, halt" and took a few
steps toward him. Garner then began to climb over the
fence. Convinced that if Garner made it over the fence he
would elude capture, 3 Hymon shot him. The bullet hit Garner in the back of the head. Garner was taken by ambulance
'The owner of the house testified that no lights were on in the house,
but that a back door light was on. Record 160. Officer Hymon, though
uncertain, stated in his deposition that there were lights on in the house.
Record 209.
2
In fact, Garner, an eighth-grader, was 15. He was 5' 4" tall and
weighed somewhere around 100 or 110 pounds. App. to Pet. for Cert. A5.
3
When asked at trial why he fired, Hymon stated:
"Well, first of all it was apparent to me from the little bit that I knew about
the area at the time that he was going to get away because, number one, I
couldn't get to him. My partner then couldn't find where he was because,
you know, he was late coming around. He didn't know where I was talking about. I couldn't get to him because of the fence here, I couldn't have
jumped this fence and come up, consequently jumped this fence and caught
him before he got away because he was already up on the fence, just one
leap and he was already over the fence, and so there is no way that I could
have caught him." App. 52.
He also stated that the area beyond the fence was dark, that he could not
have gotten over the fence easily because he was carrying a lot of equipment and wearing heavy boots, and that Garner, being younger and more
energetic, could have outrun him. !d., at 53-54.

;
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to a hospital, where he died on the operating table. Ten dollars and a purse taken from the house were found on his
body. 4
In using deadly force to prevent the escape, Hymon was
acting under the authority of a Tennesse statute and pursuant to police department policy. The statute provides that
"[i]f, after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he
either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest." Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 40-7-108. 5 The department policy was slightly more restrictive than the statute, but still allowed the use of deadly
force in cases of burglary. App. 140-144. The incident was
reviewed by the Memphis Police Firearm's Review Board
and presented to a grand jury. Neither took any action.
App. 57.
Garner's father then brought this action in the Federal District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, seeking
damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for asserted violations of
Garner's constitutional rights. The complaint alleged that
the shooting violated the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
It named as defendants Officer Hymon, the police department, its Director, and the Mayor and city of Memphis.
Mter a 3-day bench trial, the District Court entered judgment for all defendants. It dismissed the claims against the
Mayor and the Director for lack of evidence. It then concluded that Hymon's actions were authorized by the Tennessee statute, which in turn was constitutional. Hymon had
• Garner had rummaged through one room in the house, in which, in the
words of the owner, "all the stuff was out on the floor, all the drawers was
pulled out, and stuff was scattered all over." App. 34. The owner testified that his valuables were untouched but that, in addition to the purse
and the 10 dollars, one of his wife's rings was missing. The ring was not
recovered. App. 34-35.
' Although the statute does not say so explicitly, Tennessee law forbids
the use of deadly force in the arrest of a misdemeanant. See Johnson v.
State, 173 Tenn. 134, 114 S. W. 2d 819 (1938).
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employed the only reasonable and practicable means of preventing Garner's escape. Garner had "recklessly and heedlessly attempted to vault over the fence to escape, thereby
assuming the risk of being fired upon." App. to Pet. for
Cert. A10.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed with
regard to Hyman, finding that he had acted in good faith reliance on the Tennessee statute and was therefore within the
scope of his qualified immunity. 600 F. 2d 52 (1979). It remanded for reconsideration of the possible liability of the
city, however, in light of Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978), which had come down after
the District Court's decision. The District Court was directed to consider whether a city enjoyed a qualified immunity, whether the use of deadly force and hollow point bullets
in these circumstances was constitutional, and whether any
unconstitutional municipal conduct flowed from a "policy or
custom" as required for liability under Monell. 600 F. 2d, at
54-55.
The District Court concluded that Monell did not affect its
decision. While acknowledging some doubt as to the possible immunity of the city, it found that the sta~and
Hyman's actions, were constitutional. Given this conclusion, 1 ec me o consider the "policy or custom" question.
App. to Pet. for Cert. A37-A39.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. 710 F. 2d
240 (CA6 1983). It reasoned that the killing of a fleeing suspect is a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment, 6 and is
therefore co"nstitutional only if "reasonable." The Tennessee
statute failed as applied to this case because it did not adequately limit the use of deadly force by distinguishing between felonies of different magnitudes-"The facts, as found,
did not justify the use of deadly force under the Fourth
• "The right of the people to be secure in their persons
against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . ... " U. S.
Canst. , Arndt. 4.
0

0

0
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Amendment." I d., at 246. Officers cannot resort to deadly
force unless they "have probable cause to believe that the
suspect [has committed a felony <md] p~to the
safety of the officers or a danger to the communit.YJ.f left at
lar~~.

he State of Tennessee, which had intervened to defend
the statute, see 28 U. S. C. § 2403(c), appealed to this Court.
No. 83-1035. The city filed a petition for certiorari. No.
83-1070. We noted probable jurisdiction in the appeal and
granted the petition. - - U. S. - - (1984).
II

Whenever an officer restrains the free~<pn of a person
to walk away, he has seized that person. '1Jnited States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 (1975). While it is not
always clear just when minimal,ifolice interference becomes a
seizure, see ' United States ¥.'-Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544
(1980), there can be no question that apprehension by the use
7
The Court of Appeals concluded that the rule set out in the Model
Penal Code "accurately states Fourth Amendment limitations on the use of
deadly force against fleeing felons." 710 F. 2d, at 247. The relevant portion of the Model Penal Code provides:
"The use of deadly force is not justifiable ... unless (i) the arrest is for a
felony, and (ii) the person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a
peace officer or is assisting a person whom he believes to be authorized to
act as a peace officer; and (iii) the actor believes that the force employed
creates no substantial risk of injury to innocent persons; and (iv) the actor
believes that (1) the crime for which the arrest is made involved conduct
including the use or threatened use of deadly force; or (2) there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious
bodily harm if his apprehension is delayed." American Law Institute,
Model Penal Code § 3.07(2)(b) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
The court also found that the Due Process Clause required the same result, because the statute was not narrowly drawn to further a compelling
state interest. The court considered the generalized interest in effective
law enforcement sufficiently compelling only when the the suspect is dangerous. Finally, the court held, relying on Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U. S. 622 (1980), that the city was not immune.
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of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness re------quirement of the Fourth Amendment.
A

A police officer may arrest a person if he has probable
cause to believe that person committed a crime. E. g.,
United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976). Petitioners
argue that if this requirement is satisfied the Fourth Amendment has nothing to say about how that seizure is made.
This submission ignores the many cases in which this Court,
by balancin the extent of the intrusion a ainst th need for
it, has examine t e reasona eness of the manner in which a
search or seizure is conducted. To determine the constitutionality of a seizure "[w]e must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental inte~sts
alleged to justify the intrusion." United Statey-v. 'rPlace,
- - U. S. - - , - - (1983); see Dela7!JI-Lre v. -Prouse, 440
U. S. 648, 654 (1979); United States v. 'Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U. S. 543, 555 (1976). We have described "the balancing of
competing intere§,ts" as "the key principle of the Fourth
Amendment." vMichirJ.I1n v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 700, n.
12 (1981). See also>Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S.
523, 536-537 (1967). Because one of the factors is the extent
of the intrusion, it is plain that reasonableness depends on
not only when a seizure is made, but also how it is carried
out. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 895 (1975); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 28-29 (1968).
Applying these principles to particular facts, the Court has
held that governmental interests did not support a lengthy
detention of luggage, United States v. Place, supra, an airport seizure not "carefully tailored to its underlying justification," Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 505-505 (1983) (plurality opinion), surgery under general anasthesia to obtain
evidence, Winston v. Lee, - - U. S. - - (1985), or detention for fingerprinting without probable cause, Davis v. Mis-
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sissippi, 394 U. S. 721 (1969). On the other hand, under the
same approach it has UP.held the takin of fin ernail scrapiJlgs from a suspect,c.-Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291 (1973),
an unannounced entry into a home to prevent the destruction
of evidence, Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963), administrative housing inspections without a warrant and without
probable cause to believe that a code violation will be found,
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, and a blood test of a
drunk-driving suspect, Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S.
757 (1966). In each of these cases, the question was whether
the totality of the circumstances justified a particular sort of
search or seizure.
B

The SJt_me balancing proc~ss applied in the cases cited
above demonstrates that, notwithstanding probable cause to
seize a suspect, an officer may not always do so by killing
him. The intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly force
is unmatched. The suspect's fundamental interest in his own
life need not be elaborated upon. The use of deadly force
also frustrates the interest of the individual, and of society, in
judicial determination of guilt and punishment. Against this
interest petitioners and appellant range governmental interests in effective law enforcement. They argue that overall
violence will be reduced by encouraging the peaceful submission of suspects who know that they may be shot if they flee.
Effectiveness in making arrests requires the resort to deadly
force, or at least the meaningful threat thereof. "Being able
to arrest such individuals is a condition precedent to the
state's entire system of law enforcement." Brief for Petitioners 14.
Without in any way disparaging the importance of these
goals, we are not convinced that the use of deadly force is a
sufficiently productive means of accomplishing them to justify the killin of nonviolent suspects. Cf. Delaware v.
Prouse, supra, at 659.
e use of deadly force is a self-

"
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defeating way of apprehending a suspect and so setting the
criminal justice mechanism in motion. If successful, it guarantees that that mechanism will not be set in motion. And
while the meaningful threat of deadly force might be thought
to lead to the arrest of more live suspects by discouraging escape attempts, 8 the presently available evidence does not
support this thesis. 9 The fact is that a majority of police departments in this country have forbidden the use of deadly
force against nonviolent suspects. See Section IIIC, infra.
If those charged with the enforcement of the criminal law
have abjured the use of deadly force in arresting nondangerous felons, there is a substantial basis for doubting that the
8
We note that the usual manner of deterring illegal conduct-through
punishment-has been largely ignored in connection with flight from arrest. Arkansas, for example, specifically excepts flight from arrest from
the offense of"obstruction of governmental operations." The commentary
notes that this "reflects the basic policy judgment that, absent the use of {
force or violence, a mere attempt to avoid apprehension by a law enforcement officer does not give rise to an independent offense." Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 41-2802(3)(a) and commentary. In the few States that do outlaw
flight from an arresting officer, the crime is only a misdemeanor. See,
e. g., Ind. Code§ 35-44-3-3. Even forceful resistance, though generally a
separate offense, is classified as a misdemeanor. E. g., Ill. Rev. Stat., ch.
38, § 31-1; Mont. Code Ann. § 45-7-301; N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 642:2;
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 162.315.
This le~ach does avoid the anomoly of automatically transforming every fleeing misdemeanant into a fleeing felon-subject, under
the common law rule, to apprehension by deadly force-solely by virtue of
his flight. However, it is in real tension with the harsh consequences of
flight in cases where deadly force is employed. For example, Tennessee
does not outlaw fleeing from arrest. The Memphis City Code does,
§ 30-15, subjecting the offender to a maximum fine of $50, § 1-8. Thus,
Garner's attempted escape subjected him to (a) a $50 fine, and (b) being
shot.
9
See M. Punch, Control in the Police Organization 98 (1983); Fyfe, Observations on Police Deadly Force, 27 Crime & Delinqu. 376, 378-381
(1981); W. Geller & K. Karales, Split-Second Decisions 67 (1981); App. 84
(Affidavit of William Bracey, Chief of Patrol, New York City Police Department). See generally Brief for the Police Foundation et a!. as Amici
Curiae.

~
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use of such force is an essential attribute of the arrest power
in all felony cases. See Schumann v. McGinn, 240 N. W. 2d
525, 540 (Minn. 1976) (Rogosheske, J., dissenting in part).
Petitioners and appellant have not persuaded us that shooting nondangerous fleeing suspects is so vital as to outweigh
the suspect's interest in his own life.
The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony
sus_R,ects, w atever e c1rcums ances, is constitutionally unreasonable. -. It IS not Detter that all felony SUSpects die than
eSC"ape: Where the suspect poses no immediate threat, the
harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify
the use of deadly force to do so. It is no doubt unfortunate
when a suspect who is in sight escapes, but the fact that the
police arrive a little late or are a little slower afoot does not
always justify killing the suspect. A police officer may not
seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him
dead. The Tennessee statute is unconstitutional insofar as it
authorizes the use of deadly force against such fleeing
suspects.
It is not, however, unconstitutional on its face. Where the
o~r~onably: bel~ves that the suspectpoSes a threat of
serious__,Q! !ZSical harm, ~e officer or to otfiers, it is
not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using
deadly force. If a fleeing suspect is armed with a lethal
weapon or if there is ;erobable cause to b~ieve th.i;!t h.e..-has
committed a crime involvin the inflicti'on or threatened infliction o se 1ous ph sical harm, deadly force may e used if
necessary o prevent escape and if, where feasible, some
warning has been given. As applied in such circumstances,
the Tennessee statute passes constitutional muster.
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A
It is insisted that the Fourth Amendment must be construed in light of the common law rule allowing the use of
whatever force that was necessary to effect the arrest of a
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fleeing felon, though not a misdemeanant. As stated by
Hale in 1788:
"If persons that are pursued by these officers for felony
or the just suspicion thereof . . . shall not yield themselves to these officers, but shall either resist or fly before they are apprehended or being apprehended shall
rescue themselves and resist or fly, so that they cannot
otherwise be apprehended, and are upon necessity slain
therein, because they cannot be otherwise taken, it is no
felony." 2 Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown
85-86 (1788). See also 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries
on the Laws of England *289.
Most American jurisdictions also imposed a flat prohibition
against the use of deadly force td stop a fleeing misdemeanant, coupled with a general privilege to use such force to
stop a fleeing felon. E. g., Holloway v. Moser, 193 N. C.
185, 136 S. E. 375 (1927); State v. Smith, 103 N. W. 944,
945 (Iowa 1905); Reneau v. State, 70 Tenn. 720 (1879); Brooks
v. Commonwealth, 61 Pa. 352 (1869); Roberts v. State, 14
Mo. 138 (1851); see generally R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law 1098-1102 (3d ed. 1982); Day, Shooting the Fleeing
Felon: State of the Law, 14 Grim. L. Bull. 285, 286-287
(1978); Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev.
798, 807-816 (1924). But see Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 329
(1882); State v. Bryant, 65 N. C. 327, 328 (1871); Caldwell v.
State, 41 Tex. 86 (1874).
The State and city argue that because this was the prevailing rule at the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment
and for some time thereafter, and is still a frequent rule, use
of deadly force against a fleeing felon must be "reasonable."
It is true that this Court has often looked to the common law
in evaluating the reasonableness, for Fourth Amendment
purposes, of police activity. See, e. g., United States v.
Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 418-419 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U. S. 103, 111, 114 (1975); Carroll v. United States, 267
U. S. 132, 149-153 (1925). On the other hand, it "has not
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simply frozen into constitutional law those law enforcement
practices that existed at the time of the Fourth Amendment's
passage." Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 591, n. 33
(1980). Because of sweeping change in the legal and technological context, reliance on the common law rule in this case
would be a mistaken literalism that ignores the purposes of a
historical inquiry.
B
It has been pointed out many times that the common law
rule is best understood in light of the fact that it arose at a
time when virtually all felonies were punishable by death. 10
"Though effected without the protections and formalities of
an orderly trial and conviction, the killing of a resisting or
fleeing felon resulted in no greater consequences than those
authorized for punishment of the felony of which the individual was charged or suspected." Model Penal Code § 3.07,
Comment 3, at 56 (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1958) (hereinafter
Model Penal Code Comm.ent). Courts have also justified the
common law rule by emphasizing the relative dangerousness
of felons. See, e. g., Schumann v. McGinn, 240 N. W. 2d
525, 533 (Minn. 1976); Holloway v. Moser, 193 N. C. 185,
187, 136 S. E. 375, 376 (1927).
Neither of these justifications makes sense today. Almost
all crimes formerly punishable by death no longer are or can
be. See, e. g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 762 (1978);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584 (1977). And while in earlier
10
The roots of the concept of a "felony" lie not in capital punishment but
in forfeiture. 2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 465
(2d ed. 1909) (hereinafter Pollock & Maitland). Not all felonies were always punishable by death. See id., at 466-467, n. 3. Nonetheless, the
link was profound. Blackstone was able to write that "[t]he idea of felon is
indeed so generally connected with that of capital punishment, that we find
it hard to separate them; and to this usage the interpretations of the law do
now conform. And therefore if a statute makes any new offence felony the
law implies that is shall be punished with death, viz. by hanging, as well as
with forfeiture .... " 4 W. Blackstone *98. See also R. Perkins & R.
Boyce, Criminal Law 14-15 (3d ed. 1982); 2 Pollock and Maitland 511.
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times "the gulf between the felonies and the minor offences
was broad and deep," 2 Pollock & Maitland 467 n. 3; Carroll
v. United States, 367 U. S. 132, 158 (1925), today the distinction is minor and often arbitrary. Many crimes considered
to be misdemeanors, or nonexistent, at common law are now
felonies. Wilgus 572-573. These changes have undermined
the concept, which was questionable to begin with, that use
of deadly force against a fleeing felon is merely a speedier
execution of someone who has already forfeited his life.
They have also made the assumption that a "felon" is more
dangerous than a misdemeanant untenable. Indeed, numerous misdemeanors involve conduct more dangerous than
many felonies. 11
There i~ an additional reason that the common law rule
cannot be directly translated to the present day. The common law rule developed at a time when weapons were rudimentary. Deadly force could be inflicted almost solely in a
hand-to-hand struggle during which, necessarily, the safety
of the arresting officer was at risk. Handguns were not carried by police officers until the latter half of the last century.
L. Kennett & J. Anderson, The Gun in America 91 (1975).
Only then did it become possible to use deadly force from a
distance as a means of apprehension. As a practical matter,
the use of deadly force under the standard articulation of the
common law rule has an altogether different meaning-and
harsher consequences-now than in past centuries. See
Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale for the Law of Homicide: I,
37 Colum. L. Rev. 701, 741 (1937). 12
11

White collar crime, for example, poses a less significant physical threat
than, say, drunken driving. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, -U.S. (1984); id., a t - (BLACKMUN, J., concurring). See Model Penal Code,
comment 57.
12
It has been argued that sophisticated techniques of apprehension and
increased communication between the police in different jurisdictions have
made it more likely that an escapee will be caught than was once the case,
and that this change has reduced the "reasonableness" of the use of deadly
force to prevent escape. E. g., Sherman, Execution Without Trial: Police
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One other aspect of the common law rule bears emphasis.
It forbids the use of deadly force to apprehend a misdemeanant, condemning such action as disproportionately severe. See Holloway v. Moser, 193 N. C. 185, 187, 136 S. E.
2d 375, 376 (1927); State v. Smith, 103 N. W. 944, 945 (Iowa
1905).
In short, though the common law pedigree of Tennessee's
rule is pure on its face, changes in the legal and technological
context mean the rule is distorted almost beyond recognition
when literally applied.
B
In evaluating the reasonableness of police procedures
under the Fourth Amendment, we haye also looked to prevailing rules in individual jurisdictions. See, e. g., United
States v. Watson, supra, at 421-422. The rules in the States
are varied. Some 19 States have codified the common law
rule, 13 though in two of these the courts have significantly
limited the statute. 14 · Four States, though without a releHomicide and the Constitution 33 Vand. L. Rev. 71, 76 (1980). We are
unaware of any data that would permit sensible evaluation of this claim.
Current arrest rates are sufficiently low, however, that we have some
doubt whether in past centuries the failure to arrest at the scene meant
that the police had missed their only chance in a way that is not presently
the case. In 1983, 21% of the offenses in the FBI crime index were cleared
by arrest. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Index 159
(1983). The clearance rate for burglary was 15%. Ibid.
13
Ala. Code § 13A-3-27; Ark. State. Ann. § 41-510; Cal. Penal Code
Ann. § 196 (West); Conn. Gen Stat. § 53(a)-22; Fla. Stat. § 776.05; Idaho
Code § 19-610; Ind. Code § 35-41-3-3; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3215; Miss.
Code Ann. § 97-3-15(d); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.046; Nev. Rev. Stat.
§200.140; N. M. Stat. Ann. §30-2-6; Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §732; Ore. Rev.
Stat. § 161.239; R. I. Gen. Laws§ 12-7-9; SD Code§§ 22-26-32, -33; Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-7-108; Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.16.040(3). Wisonsin's statute is ambiguous, but should probably be added to this list. Wis. Stat.
§ 939.45(4) (officer may use force necessary for "a reasonable accomplishment of a lawful arrest").
14
In California, the police may use deadly force to arrest only if the
crime for which the arrest is sought was "a forcible and atrocious one which
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vant statute, apparently retain the common law rule. 15
Three States have adopted the Model Penal Code's provision
verbatim. 16 Sixteen others allow, in slightly varying language, the use of deadly force only if the suspect has committed a felony involving physical or deadly force, or is escaping
with a deadly weapon, or is likely to endanger life or inflict
serious physical injury if not arrested. 17 Louisiana and Verthreatens death or serious bodily hann," or there is a substantial risk that
the person whose arrest is sought will cause death or serious bodily hann if
apprehension is delayed. Kortum v. Alkire, 69 Cal. App. 3d 325, 333, 138
Cal. Rptr. 26, 30-31 (1977). See also People v. Ceballos, 12 Cal.3d 470,
476-484, 526 P. 2d 241, 245-248 (1974); Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v.
Long Beach, 61 Cal. App. 3d 364, 373-374, 132 Cal. Rptr. 348, 353-354
(1976). In Indiana, deadly force may be used only to prevent injury, the
imminent danger of injury or force, or the threat of force. It is not permitted simply to prevent escape. Rose v. State, 431 N. E. 2d 521 (Ind. App.
1982).
16
These are Michigan, Ohio, Virginia, and West Virginia. Werner v.
Hartfelder, 113 Mich. App. 747, 318 N. W. 2d 825 (1982); State v. Foster,
60 Ohio Misc. 46, 396 N. E. 2d 246, 255-258 (Com. Pl. 1979) (citing cases);
Berry v. Hamman, 203 Va. 596, 125 S. E. 2d 851 (1962); Thompson v.
Norfolk & W. R., 182 S. E. 880, 883-884 (W. Va. 1935).
16
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 703-307; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1412; N. J. Stat.
Ann. § 2C:3-7. Seen. 7, supra.
17
Alaska Stat. Ann. § 11.81.370(a); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-410; Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 18-1-707; Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 467 (felony involving
physical force and a substantial risk that the suspect will cause death or
serious bodily injury or will never be recaptured); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38,
§ 7-5; Iowa Code § 804.8 (suspect has used or threatened deadly force in
commission of a felony, or would use deadly force if not caught); Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 503.090 (suspect committed felony involving use or threat of physical force likely to cause death or serious injury, and is likely to endanger
life unless apprehended without delay); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A,
§ 107 (commentary notes that deadly force may be used only "where the
person arrested poses a threat to human life"); Minn. Stat. § 609.066; N. H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 627:5(11) (Supp.); N. Y. Penal Law § 35.30; N. C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-401; N. D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-07.2.d; Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit.
18, § 508 (Purdon); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.51(c); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2404. Massachusetts probably belongs in this category. Though it once
rejected distinctions between felonies, Uraneck v. Lima, 359 Mass. 749,
750 (1971), it has since adopted the Model Penal Code limitations with re-
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mont, though without statutes or case law on point, do forbid
the use of deadly force to prevent any but violent felonies. 18
The remaining States either have no relevant statute or caselaw, or have positions that are unclear. 19
It is not accurate to say that there is a constant or overwhelming trend away from the common law rule. In recent
years, some States have reviewed their laws and expressly
rejected abandonment of the common law rule. 20 Nonetheless, the long-term movement has been away from the rule
that deadly force may be used against any fleeing felon, and
that remains the rule in less than half the States.
This trend is more evident and impressive when viewed in
light of the policies adopted by the police departments themselves. Overwhelmingly, these are more restrictive than
the common law rule. C. Milton et al., Police Use of Deadly
Force 45-46 (1977). The Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the New York City Police Department, for example 1
both forbid the use of firearms except when necessary to pregard to private citizens, Commonwealth v. Klein, 372 Mass. 823, 363 N. E.
2d 1313 (1977), and seems to have extended that decision to police officers,
Julian v. Randazzo, 380 Mass. 391, 403 N. E. 2d 931 (1980).
18
See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:20(2) (West); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 53,
§ 2305. A Federal District Court has interpreted the Louisiana statute to
limit the use of deadly force against fleeing suspects to situations where
"life itself is endangered or great bodily harm is threatened." Sauls v.
Hutto, 304 F. Supp. 124, 132 (ED La. 1969).
19
These are Georgia, Maryland, Montana, South Carolina, and Wyoming. A Maryland appellate court has indicated that deadly force may not
be used against a felon who "was in the process of fleeing and, at the time,
presented no immediate danger to ... anyone .... " Giant Food, Inc. v.
Scherry, 445 A. 2d 483, 486, 489 (Md. App. 1982).
20
In adopting its current statute in 1979, for example, Alabama expressly chose the common law rule over more restrictive provisions. Ala.
Code pp. 67-68 (1982). Missouri likewise considered but rejected a proposal akin to the Model Penal Code rule. See Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F. 2d
1007, 1022 (CA6 1976) (Gibson, C. J., dissenting), vacated as moot, 431
U. S. 171 (1977). Idaho, whose current statute codifies the common law
rule, adopted the Model Penal Code in 1971, but abandoned it in 1972.
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vent death or grievous bodily harm. I d., at 40-41; App. 83.
For accreditation by the Commission on Accreditation for
Law Enforcement Agencies, a department must restrict the
use of deadly force to situations where "the officer reasonably
believes that the action is in defense of human life . . . or in
defense of any person in immediate danger of serious physical
injury." Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement
Agencies, Inc., Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies
1-2 (1983). A 1974 study reported that the police department regulations in a majority of the large cities of the
United States allowed the firing of a weapon only when a
felon presented a threat of death or serious bodily harm.
Boston Police Department, Planning & Research Division,
The Use of Deadly Force by Boston Police Personnel (1974),
cited in Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F. 2d 1007, 1016, n. 9 (CA8
1976), vacated as moot, 431 U. S. 171 (1977). Overall, only
7.5% of departmental and municipal polices explicitly permit
the use of deadly force against any felon; 86.8% explicitly do
not. Matulia, A Balance of Forces: A Report of the International Association of Chiefs of Police 161 (1982) (table). See
also Record 1108-1368 (written policies of 44 departments).
See generally Brief for The Police Foundation, et al., as
Amici Curiae. In light of the rules adopted by those who
must actually administer them, the older and fading common
law view is a dubious indicia of the constitutionality of the
Tennessee statute now before us.

c
Actual departmental policies are important for an additional reason. We would hesitate to declare a police practice
of long standing "unreasonable" if doing so would severely
hamper effective law enforcement. But the indications are
to the contrary. Amici note that "[a]fter extensive research
and consideration, [they] have concluded that laws permitting police officers to use deadly force to apprehend unarmed,
non-violent fleeing felony suspects actually do not protect cit-

l
I

83-1035-0PINION
TENNESSEE v. GARNER

17

izens or law enforcement officers, do not deter crime or alleviate problems cause by crime, and do not improve the crimefighting ability of law enforcement agencies." Brief for
Police Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 11. The submission is that the obvious state interests in apprehension are
not sufficiently served to warrant the use of lethal weapons
against all fleeing felons.
Nor do we agree with petitioners that the rule we have
adopted requires the police to make impossible, split-second
evaluations of unknowable facts. See Brief for Petitioners
11; Brief for Appellant 25. We do not deny the practical difficulties of attempting to assess the suspect's dangerousness.
However, similarly difficult judgments must be made by the
police in equally uncertain circumstances. See, e. g., Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20, 27 (1968). Moreover, the highly
technical felony/misdemeanor distinction is equally, if not
more, difficult to apply in the field. An officer is in no position to know, for example, the precise value of property stolen, or to know whether the crime was a first or second offense. Finally, as noted above, this claim must be viewed
with suspicion in light of the similar self-imposed limitations
of so many police departments.
IV

The District Court concluded that Hymon was justified in
shooting Garner because state law allows, and the Federal
Constitution does not forbid, the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of a fleeing felony suspect if no alternative
means of apprehension is available. See App. to Pet. for
Cert. A9-All, A38. This conlusion made a determination of
Garner's apparent dangerousness unnecessary. The court
did find, however, that Garner appeared to be unarmed,
though Hymon could not be certain that was the case. I d.,
at A4, A23. Restated in Fourth Amendment terms, this
means Hymon had no articulable basis to think Garner was
armed.
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In reversing, the Court of Appeals accepted the District
Court's factual conclusions and held that "the facts, as found,
did not justify the use of deadly force." 710 F. 2d, at 246.
We agree. While we recognize the seriousness of the crime
of burglary/1 Officer Hymon could not reasonably have ~e
lieved that Garner-young, slight, and unarmed-posed any
tlireat. Indeed, Hyman never attempted to justify his actions on any basis other than the need to prevent an escape.
The District Court stated in passing that "[t]he facts of this
case did not indicate to Officer Hymon that Garner was 'nondangerous.'" App. to Pet. for Cert. A34. This conclusion is
not explained, and seems to be based solely on the fact that
Garner had broken into a house at night. However, the fact
that Garner was a suspected burglar could not, without regard to the other circumstances, automatically justify the use
o ea y orce.
ymon 1 not have a reasonable belief th"at
Garner, whom he correctly believed to be unarmed, posed
any physical danger to himself or others.

v
We wish to make clear what our holding means in the context of this case. The complaint has been dismissed as to all
21

The Federal Bureau of Investigation classifies burglary as a "property'' rather than a "violent" crime. See Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Uniform Crime Reports 1 (1983). However, burglary has also been
viewed as an inherently life-threatening crime. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Klein, 363 N. E. 2d 1313, 1319 and n. 9 (Mass. 1977); W. Prosser,
Law of Torts 134 (4th ed. 1964). Some state statutes that limit the use of
deadly force to certain violent felonies include burglary in the list. See Ill.
Rev. Stat. Ann., ch. 38, § 7-5. As this case demonstrates, however, the
fact that someone has broken into a dwelling at night does not automatically mean he is physically dangerous. See also Solem v. Helm, U. S. - , - - - a n d nn. 22-23 (1983). In fact, the available statistics indicate that burglaries only rarely involve physical violence. See
T. Reppetto, Residential Crime 17, 105 (1974); Conklin & Bittner, Burglary in a Suburb, 11 Criminology 208, 214 (1974). The instances where
violence has taken place and an officer pursuing the suspect is unaware of it
will be even fewer.

t

83-103~PINION

TENNESSEE v. GARNER

19

the individual defendants. The State is a party only by virtue of 28 U. S. C. § 2403(c) and is not subject to liability.
The possible liability of the remaining defendants-the police
department and the city of Memphis-hinges on Monell v.
Department of Social Services, supra, and is left for remand.
We hold that the statute is invalid insofar as it purported to
give Hymon the authority to act as he did. As for the policy
of the police department, the absence of any discussion of this
issue by the courts below, and the uncertain state of the
record, preclude any consideration of its validity.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed and the
case remanded for further procedings consistent with this
opinion.
So ordered.
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting.
The Court today holds that the Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from using deadly force as a last resort to
apprehend a criminal suspect who refuses to halt when fleeing the scene of a nighttime burglary. This conclusion rests
on the majority's balancing of the interests of the suspect and
the public interest in effective law enforcement. Ante, at 6.
Notwithstanding the venerable common law rule authorizing
the use of deadly force if necessary to apprehend a fleeing
felon, and continued acceptance of this rule by nearly half the
States, ante, at 13-15, the majority concludes that Tennessee's statute is unconstitutional inasmuch as it allows the use
of such force to apprehend a burglary suspect who is not obviously armed or otherwise dangerous. Although the circumstances of this case are unquestionably tragic and unfortunate, our constitutional holdings must be sensitive to both
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the history of the Fourth Amendment and to the general implications of the Court's reasoning. By disregarding the
serious and dangerous nature of residential burglaries and
the longstanding practice of many States, the Court effectively creates a Fourth Amendment right allowing a burglary
suspect to flee unimpeded from a police officer who has probable cause to arrest, who has ordered the suspect to halt, and
who has no means short of firing his weapon to prevent escape. I do not believe that the Fourth Amendment supports
such a right, and I accordingly dissent.
I

The facts below warrant brief review because they highlight the difficult, split-second decisions police officers must
make in these circumstances. Memphis Police Officers
Elton Hymon and Leslie Wright responded to a late-night
call that a burglary was in progress at a private residence.
When the officers arrived at the scene, the caller said that
''they'' were breaking into the house next door. App. 207.
The officers found the residence had been forcibly entered
through a window and saw lights on inside the house. Officer Hymon testified that when he saw the broken window he
realized "that something was wrong inside," id., at 656, but
that he could not determine whether anyone- either a burglar or a member of the household- was within the residence. I d., at 209. As Officer Hymon walked behind the
house, he heard a door slam. He saw Edward Eugene Garner run away from the house through the dark and cluttered
backyard. Garner crouched next to a six-foot-high fence.
Officer Hymon thought Garner was an adult and was unsure
whether Garner was armed because Hymon "had no idea
what was in the hand [that he could not see] or what he might
have had on his person." I d., at 658-659. In fact, Garner
was 15-years old and unarmed. Hymon also did not know
whether accomplices remained inside the house. !d., at 657.
The officer identified himself as a police officer and ordered
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Garner to halt. Garner paused briefly and then sprang to
the top of the fence. Believing that Garner would escape if
he climbed over the fence, Hymon fired his revolver and mortally wounded the suspected burglar.
Respondent, the deceased's father, filed a § 1983 action in
federal court against Hymon, the city of Memphis, and other
defendants, for asserted violations of Garner's constitutional
rights. The District Court for the Western District of Tennessee held that Officer Hymon's actions were justified by a
Tennessee statute that authorizes a police officer to "use all
the necessary means to effect the arrest," if "after notice of
the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-808. As construed by
the Tennessee courts, this statute allows the use of deadly
force only if a police officer has probable cause to believe that
a person has committed a felony, the officer warns the person
that he intends to arrest him, and the officer reasonably believes that no means less than such force will prevent the
escape. See, e. g., Johnson v. State, 173 Tenn. 134, 114
S. W. 2d 819 (1938). The District Court held that the Tennessee statute is constitutional and that Hymon's actions as
authorized by that statute did not violate Garner's constitutional rights. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed on the grounds that the Tennessee statute "authorizing the killing of an unarmed, nonviolent fleeing felon by
police in order to prevent escape" violates the Fourth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 710 F . 2d 240, 244 (1983).
The Court affirms on the ground that application of the
Tennessee statute to authorize Officer Hymon's use of deadly
force constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. The precise issue before the Court deserves emphasis, because both the decision below and the
majority obscure what must be decided in this case. The
issue is not the constitutional validity of the Tennessee statute on its face or as applied to some hypothetical set of facts.

,.
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Instead, the issue is whether the use of deadly force by Officer Hymon under the circumstances of this case violated Garner's constitutional rights. Thus, the majority's assertion
that a police officer who has probable cause to seize a suspect
"may not always do so by killing him," ante, at 7, is unexceptionable but also of little relevance to the question presented
here. The same is true of the rhetorically stirring statement
that "[t]he use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally
unreasonable." I d., at 9. The question we must address is
whether the Constitution allows the use of such force to apprehend a suspect who resists arrest by attempting to flee
the scene of a nighttime burglary of a residence. ·
II

For purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, I agree with
the Court that Officer Hymon "seized" Garner by shooting
him. Whether that seizure was reasonable and therefore
permitted by the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the important public interest in crime prevention
and detection and the nature and quality of the intrusion
upon legitimate interests of the individual. United States v.
Place,-- U.S.-,-- (1983). In striking this balance
here, it is crucial to acknowledge that police use of deadly
force to apprehend a fleeing criminal suspect falls within the
''rubric of police conduct necessarily [involving] swift action
predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on
the beat." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20 (1968). The clarity of hindsight cannot provide the standard for judging the
reasonableness of police decisions made in uncertain and
often dangerous circumstances. Moreover, I am far more
reluctant than is the Court to conclude that the Fourth
Amendment proscribes a police practice that was accepted at
the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights and has continued to receive the support of many state legislatures. Although the Court has recognized that the requirements of the

.
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Fourth Amendment must respond to the reality of social and
technological change, fidelity to the notion of constitutional-as opposed to purely judicial-limits on governmental action requires us to impose a heavy burden on those
who claim that practices accepted when the Fourth Amendment was adopted are now constitutionally impermissible.
See, e. g., United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 416-421
(1976); Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149-153
(1925). Cf. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, - U. S. - - , - (1983) (slip op. 6-7, 13) (noting "impressive
historical pedigree" of statute challenged under Fourth
Amendment).
The public interest involved in the use of deadly force as a
last resort to apprehend a fleeing burglary suspect relates
primarily to the serious nature of the crime. Household burglaries represent not only the illegal entry into a person's
home, but also "pose(] real risk of serious harm to others."
Solem v. Helm,- U. S. - , - (1983) (BURGER, C. J.,
dissenting). According to recent Department of Justice statistics, "[t]hree-fifths of all rapes in the home, three-fifths of
all home :r:obberies, and about a third of home aggravated and
simple assaults are committed by burglars." Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Household Burglary, p. 1 (1985).
During the period 1973-1982, 2.8 million such violent crimes
were committed in the course of burglaries. Ibid. Victims
of a forcible intrusion into their home by a nighttime prowler
will find little consolation in the majority's confident assertions that "the fact that someone has broken into a dwelling
at night does not automatically mean he is physically dangerous" or that "burglaries only rarely involve physical violence." Ante, at 18, n. 21. Moreover, even if a particular
burglary, when viewed in retrospect, does not involve physical harm to · others, the "harsh potentialities for violence"
inherent in the forced entry into a home preclude characterization of the crime as "innocuous, inconsequential, minor,
or 'nonviolent.'" Solem v. Helm, - - U. S., at - - (BUR-

...
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C. J., dissenting). See also Restatement of Torts§ 131
Comment g (1934) (burglary is among felonies that normally
cause or threaten death or serious bodily harm); R. Perkins &
R. Boyce, Criminal Law 1110 (3d ed. 1982) (burglary is dangerous felony that creates unreasonable risk of great personal harm).
Because burglary is a serious and dangerous felony, the
public interest in the prevention and detection of the crime is
of compelling importance. Where a police officer has probable cause to arrest a suspected burglar, the use of deadly
force as a last resort might well be the only means of apprehending the suspect. With respect to a particular burglary,
subsequent investigation simply cannot represent a substitute for immediate apprehension of the criminal suspect at
the scene. See Report of President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of
Crime in a Free Society 97 (1967). Indeed, the Captain of
the Memphis Police Department testified that in his city, if
apprehension is not immediate, it is likely that ..the suspect
will not be caught. App. 334. Statutes such as Tennessee's
reflect a legislative determination that the use of deadly force
in prescribed circumstances will serve generally to protect
the public. They assist the police in apprehending suspected
perpetrators of serious crimes and provide notice that a lawful police order to stop and submit to arrest may not be
ignored with impunity. See, e. g., Wiley v. Memphis Police
Department, 548 F. 2d 1247, 1252-1253 (CA6), cert. denied,
434 U. S. 822 (1977); Jones v. Marshall, 528 F. 2d 132, 142
(CA2 1975).
The majority unconvincingly dismisses the general deterrence effects by stating that ''the presently available evidence does not support [the] thesis" that the threat of force
discourages escape and that ''there is a substantial basis for
doubting that the use of such force is an essential attribute to
the arrest power in all felony cases." Ante, at 8-9. There is
no question that the effectiveness of police use of deadly force
GER,
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is arguable and that many States or individual police departments have decided not to authorize it in circumstances similar to those presented here. But it should go without saying
that the effectiveness or popularity of a particular police
practice does not determine its constitutionality.
Cf.
Spaziano v. Florida, - - U.S. --, - - (1984) ("The
Eighth Amendment is not violated every time a State
reaches a conclusion different from a majority of its sisters
over how best to administer its criminal laws") (slip op. 16).
Moreover, the fact that police conduct pursuant to a state
statute is challenged on constitutional grounds does not
impose a burden on the State to produce social science statistics or to dispel any possible doubts about the necessity of the
conduct. This observation, I believe, has particular force
where the challenged practice both predates enactment of the
Bill of Rights and continues to be accepted by a substantial
number of the States.
Against the strong public interests justifying the conduct
at issue here must be weighed the individual interests implicated in the use of deadly force by police officers. The
majority declares that "[t]he suspect's fundamental interest
in his own life need not be elaborated upon." Ante, at 7.
This blithe assertion hardly provides an adequate substitute
for the majority's failure to acknowledge the distinctive manner in which the suspect's interest in his life is even exposed
to risk. For purposes of this case, we must recall that the
police officer, in the course of investigating a nighttime burglary, had reasonable cause to arrest the suspect and ordered
him to halt. The officer's use of force resulted because the
suspected burglar refused to heed this command and the officer reasonably believed that there was no means short of firing his weapon to apprehend the suspect. Without questioning the importance of a person's interest in his life, I do not
think this interest encompasses a right to flee unimpeded
from the scene of a burglary. Cf. Payton v. New York, 445
U. S. 573, 617, n. 14 (1980) (WmTE, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
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policemen's hands should not be tied merely because of the
possibility that the suspect will fail to cooperate with legitimate actions by law enforcement personnel"). The legitimate interests of the suspect in these circumstances are adequately accommodated by the Tennessee statute: to avoid the
use of deadly force and the consequent risk to his life, the
suspect need merely obey the valid order to halt.
A proper balancing of the interests involved suggests that
use of deadly force as a last resort to apprehend a criminal
suspect fleeing from the scene of a nighttime burglary is not
unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Admittedly, the events giving rise to this case are in retrospect deeply regrettable. No one can view the death of an
unarmed and apparently nonviolent 15-year old without sorrow, much less disapproval. Nonetheless, the reasonableness of Officer Hymon's conduct for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment cannot be evaluated by what later appears to
have been a preferable course of police action. The officer
pursued a suspect in the darkened backyard of a house that
from all indications had just been burglarized. The police
officer was not certain whether the suspect was alone or unarmed; nor did he know what had transpired inside the
house. He ordered the suspect to halt, and when the suspect refused to obey and attempted to flee into the night, the
officer fired his weapon to prevent escape. The reasonableness of this action for purposes of the Fourth Amendment is
not determined by the unfortunate nature of this particular
case; instead, the question is whether it is constitutionally
impermissible for police officers, as a last resort, to shoot a
burglary suspect fleeing the scene of the crime.
Because I reject the Fourth Amendment reasoning of the
majority and the Court of Appeals, I briefly note that no
other constitutional provision supports the decision below.
In addition to his Fourth Amendment claim, respondent also
alleged violations of que process, the Sixth Amendment right
to trial by jury, and the Eighth Amendment proscription of
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cruel and unusual punishment. These arguments were rejected by the District Court and, except for the due process
claim, not addressed by the Court of Appeals. With respect
to due process, the Court of Appeals reasoned that statutes
affecting the fundamental interest in life must be "narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at
stake." 710 F. 2d, at 244. The Court of Appeals concluded
that a statute allowing police use of deadly force is narrowly
drawn and therefore constitutional only if the use of such
force is limited to situations in which the suspect poses an
immediate threat to others. 710 F. 2d, at 246-247. Whatever the validity of Tennessee's statute in other contexts, I
cannot agree that its application iri this case resulted in a
deprivation ''without due process of law." Cf. Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 144-145 (1979). Nor do I believe
that a criminal suspect who is shot while trying to avoid
apprehension has a cognizable claim of a deprivation of his
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. See Cunningham
v. Ellington, 323 F. Supp. 1072, 1075-1076 (W. D. Tenn . .
1971) (three-judge court). Finally, because there is no indication that the use of deadly force was intended to punish
rather than to capture the suspect, there is no valid claim
under the Eighth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U. S. 520, 538-539 (1978). Accordingly, I conclude that the
District Court properly entered judgment against respondent, and I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

III
Even if I agreed that the Fourth Amendment was violated
under the circumstances of this case, I would be unable to
join the majority opinion. The reasoning of the majority is
opaque with respect to the nature of today's holding and its
more general implications. Relying on the Fourth Amendment, the majority asserts that it is constitutionally unreasonable to use deadly force against fleeing criminal suspects
who do not appear to pose a threat of serious physical harm
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to others. Ante, at 9. Although it is unclear from the language of the opinion, I assume that the majority intends the
word ''use" to include only those circumstances in which the
suspect is actually apprehended. Absent apprehension of
the suspect, there is no "seizure" for Fourth Amendment
purposes. Perhaps I impute too much to the majority opinion, but I doubt that the Court intends to allow criminal suspects who successfully escape to return later with § 1983
claims against officers who used, albeit unsuccessfully,
deadly force in their futile attempt to capture the fleeing suspect. Moreover, by declining to limit its holding to the use
of firearms, the Court unnecessarily implies that the Fourth
Amendment constrains the use of any police practice that is
potentially lethal, no matter how remote the risk. Cf. Los
Angeles v. Lyons,- U.S.- (1983).
The contours of the majority's holding are not even discernible in its application to the narrow question presented
by this case. The majority first observes that deadly force
"may not be used unless necessary to prevent the escape and
the officer reasonably believes that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others." Ante, at 9 (emphasis added). Such a belief,
the majority further suggests, is reasonable and therefore
justified if the "suspect is armed with a lethal weapon or if
there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a
crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm." Ibid. (emphasis added). The majority
indicates, however, that a police officer need not have actual
knowledge that the suspect is armed; instead, an articulable
basis to think the suspect is armed apparently will justify the
use of deadly force. Even assuming that a police officer confronted with a fleeing suspect who is possibly dangerous and
refuses to heed a valid order to halt can "make subtle
discriminations that perplex even judges in their chambers,"
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 619 (WHITE, J., dissenting), the majority opinion leaves unclear the very require-
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ments the Court today imposes on police conduct. Finally,
even if it were appropriate in this case to limit the use of
deadly force to the ambiguous class of suspects who "pose a
significant threat of death or serious physical injury'' to others, see Wiley v. Memphis Police Department, 548 F. 2d, at
1253, I believe that class should include nighttime burglars
who resist arrest by attempting to flee the scene of the crime.
The ambiguities in the majority opinion simply invite second-quessing of difficult police decisions that must be made
quickly in the most trying of circumstances. Cf. Payton v.
New York, 445 U. S., at 619 (WHITE, J., dissenting). The
majority states that the use of deadly force is permissible if
the suspect is armed with a lethal weapon. Ante, at 9. It is
unclear, however, whether a police officer's use of deadly
force can be justified by the after-the-fact discovery that the
suspect was armed. The majority's reasoning may imply
that the result in this case would be no different if Garner in
fact had a weapon concealed on his person. The uncertainty
created by the majority opinion is compounded because, ass'Qllling that an officer has probable cause to arrest for burglary and the suspect refuses to obey an order to halt, the
Court declines to outline the additional factors necessary to
provide an "articulable basis" for believing that the suspect is
armed or otherwise dangerous. Police are given no guidance
for determining which objects, among an array of potentially
lethal weapons ranging from guns to knives to baseball bats
to rope, will justify the use of deadly force. We can accordingly expect an escalating volume of litigation as the lower
courts struggle to determine if a police officer's split-second
decision to shoot was justified by the danger posed by a particular object and other facts related to the crime. Thus, the
majority opinion portends a burgeoning area of Fourth
Amendment doctrine concerning the circumstances in which
police officers can reasonably employ deadly force.

,.
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IV
The majority opinion sweeps broadly to adopt an ambiguous standard for the constitutionality of ·the use of deadly
force to apprehend fleeing felons. Thus, the majority
"lightly brushe[s] aside," Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at
600, a longstanding police practice that predates the Fourth
Amendment and continues to receive the approval of nearly
half of the state legislatures. I cannot accept the majority's
creation of a constitutional right to flight for burglary suspects seeking to avoid capture at the scene of the crime.
Whatever the constitutional limits on police use of deadly
force in order to apprehend a fleeing felon, I do not believe
they are exceeded in a case in which a police officer has probable cause to arrest a suspect at the scene of a residential
burglary, orders the suspect to halt, and then fires his
weapon as a last resort to prevent the suspect's escape into
the night. I respectfully dissent.
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TO: Justice Powell
FROM: Lee
RE: Nos. 83-1035 and 83-1070, Tennessee v. Garner and Memphis
Police Dept. v. Garner, Justice O'Connor's dissent
Justice O'Connor's statistics about burglary are
interesting.

See page 5 of the dissent.

am somewhat sympathetic to her view.

As you may remember, I

Even if deadly force cannot

be used to apprehend "non-violent" felons, one might view all
nighttime burglars, because of the type of crime that they
commit, as "violent felons."
Nevertheless, I think that SO'C is unfair to Justice
White's opinion, which you already have joined.

Justice White

did consider the validity of the statute "as applied."

I also

believe that BRW stated the holding in a clear, concise manner.
There are, of course, some questions unresolved by the BRW
opinion, but that is true any time the Court lays down a new rule
of law.
There is certainly no need for you to reconsider your
join of BRW's opinion.
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.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

February 15, 1985
Re:

Nos.

83-1035
83-1070

Tennessee v. Garner
Memphis Police Department v. Garner

Dear Sandra,
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,
I, f

Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:
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March 8, 1985

No. 83-1035 - Tennessee v. Garner
83-1070 - Memphis Police Department v. Garner

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Few cases have given me more trouble than this one. I
suspect it has given all of us trouble. At Conference, I was a
"reluctant affirm," unduly, as I see it on reflection by the fact
that the felon was only 15. But, if he turned out to be a
~smallish~ 25 with a long record of crime, or if it turned out that
he had left a dead woman and a wounded husband in the burgled
house, I doubt there would be much sentiment to hold the
Tennessee statute unconstitutional.
This is a proverbial, classic "hard case" and I now conclude
it produces the "bad law" attributed to that class of cases. My
note is changed to reverse and I may write something out while
joining Sandra's dissent.
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.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

March 11, 1985

Re:

No. 83-1035-Tennessee v. Garner and
No. 83-1070-Memphis Police Dept. v. Garner

Dear Byron:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

r.m.
T.M.

Justice White
cc:

The Conference
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March 22, 1985

Re:

(83-1035- Tennessee v. Cleamtee Garner, Etc., et al.
(

(83-1070- Memphis Police Department, et aL v. Cleamtee Garner, Etc.,
et al.
Dear Byron:
I have decided to consign my separate opinion in this case to
the Deathless Prose file.
I will simply join Sandra.

Justice White
Copies to the Conference
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BRW for the Court 11/9/84
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2nd draft 2/15/85
3rd draft 3/5/85
~h draft 3/18/85
Joined by LFP 12/18/~
JPS 12/18/84
HAB 12/20/84
WJB 3/6/85
TM 3/11/85
SOC dissenting
1st draft 2/12/85
2nd draft 2/21/85
Joined by WHR 2/15/85
3rd draft 3/6/85 joined by WHR
4th draft 3/11/85
Joined by CJ 3j22j85
CJ may write something while joining SOC's dissent 3/8/85
SOC will dissent 12/19/84

